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Supreme Court of Canada
Constitutional Cases 2007:
Defining Access to Justice
Patricia Hughes*

I. INTRODUCTION
“Access to justice” is a broad concept that not only encompasses
physical and financial access to courts and tribunals, but may include
any developments in law or practice that allow people to enforce their
rights, protect themselves from diminution of their rights or otherwise
defend themselves legally, and the use of the legal system to claim a
share in the “goods” and realization of the values that are said to
characterize Canadian society.
A paper written about the use of technology as relevant to access to
justice defines access to justice as asserting a claim or defence, or
creating, enforcing, modifying or discharging a legal obligation,
acquiring information about the courts or tribunals or the process,
participating in proceedings, as well as a just and transparent process
that includes “among other things, timeliness and affordability” and
allows evaluation of “all aspects [of the justice system’s operations],
particularly its fairness, effectiveness and efficiency”.1
To this definition, in one sense extensive, but in another limited to
the legal system and legal rights, I would add that the results of efforts to
increase access to justice must be not only technically successful, but
substantively meaningful. Perhaps the most basic understanding of the
concept is that economic status should not affect the ability to “access
justice”. In other words, that while no one may be explicitly prevented
from filing a lawsuit, defending him or herself or claiming discriminatory
or ill treatment at the hands of government, for example, the right has
*
Patricia Hughes, formerly the Dean of Law at the University of Calgary, is the Executive
Director of the Law Commission of Ontario.
1
Washington State Access to Justice Technology Principles (Adopted by the Washington
State Supreme Court December 3, 2004), online at: <http://www.wsba.org/atj/thewashingtonstate
accesstojusticetechnologyprinciplesasadopted3.doc>.
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little meaning if one cannot afford the process of doing so effectively.
Barriers to access do not lie only in court processes or otherwise in the
legal system itself, however, and they are not only financial; they may be
found in people’s sociological and psychological circumstances. For
example, one study of the use by abused women in immigrant
communities indicated that
[m]ost participants identified the interplay of cultural norms and
structural oppression as very profound barriers to the justice system for
abused immigrant women. All the women, no matter what their
country of origin, described their social lives as deeply rooted in
patriarchal structures. Structural constraints, such as language barriers,
perceived racism in the criminal justice system and social service
agencies, and a lack of adequate ethnocultural services and representation
were also identified as disincentives to seeking help in cases of abuse.
Participants cited dependency on the abuser for financial support
and immigration sponsorship as another major barrier. As well, most of
the women stated that a lack of knowledge of criminal and civil legal
protection in cases of abuse served as a disincentive to contacting the
justice system. They indicated they would not contact the police if they
needed assistance and protection from a violent husband or partner, or
would do so only in very extreme cases of physical violence.2

Many of the factors identified in the above passage could be
alleviated if the legal system were sufficiently responsive to the full
reality of these women’s lives; to achieve this goal, in finding
“solutions” to domestic violence, law must take into account not only the
criminal act of assault, but the need for “mediation” of cultural context,
the development of trust, provision of information in an effective way
and the need for resources to assist with employment and housing. The
way the law interacts with immigrant women who have been subject to
violence is merely one illustration of the broader understanding of access
to justice. Seen this way, “access to justice” includes not only nonconstitutional areas of law, but also a wide variety of constitutional
cases, including, for example, equality decisions; for some purposes, one
might include at least some of these cases in any discussion of access to
justice jurisprudence.

2
Baukje Miedema & Sandra Wachholz, A Complex Web: Access to Justice for Abused
Immigrant Women in New Brunswick (March 1998), at 6, online at: <http://www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/
pubs/pubspr/complexweb/complexweb_e.html#summary>.
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Several decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada relate to these
various understandings of access to justice. I will assess two decisions
that involve the basic question of financial barriers to accessing the legal
system, British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Christie3 and Little
Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Commissioner of Customs
and Revenue),4 one decision dealing with a procedural matter, Alliance
for Marriage and Family v. A. (A.)5 and one decision that raises a
broader conception of access to justice that involves potentially
conflicting equality and religious claims: Bruker v. Marcovitz.6 Another
decision that falls into this category, Hislop v. Canada, where the
meaning of “full justice”, deals with whether the declaration that a
statutory provision is unconstitutional is both prospective and
retroactive.7 The Supreme Court held that it would be only rarely that the
remedy would be retroactive to when the relevant provision of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms8 came into force and that
Hislop was not that rare case. Hislop is discussed at length elsewhere in
this volume and I do not consider it further.

II. THE DECISIONS
1. No One May Sleep under Bridges — But Not Everyone Needs To
Christie9 is an access to justice case in the most minimalist or basic
sense, since it is concerned with the financial ability of litigants to obtain
effective representation in court and with the related or obverse issue of
the capacity of lawyers to represent low-income litigants as their regular
work. Christie challenged, unsuccessfully, whether taxing legal services
is a denial of the rule of law and the Charter. Christie illustrates the
principle that how one frames the issue can more or less dictate the
result, or, one might say, an example of how a little more access to
justice (or more modestly, the legal system) can be denied because the

3

[2007] S.C.J. No. 21, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 873 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Christie”].
[2007] S.C.J. No. 2, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 38 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Little Sisters (No. 2)”].
5
[2007] S.C.J. No. 40, 2007 SCC 40 (S.C.C.).
6
[2007] S.C.J. No. 54, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 607 (S.C.C.).
7
[2007] S.C.J. No. 10, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hislop”].
8
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.)
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
9
Supra, note 3.
4
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court chooses to treat it as a big increase in access to justice (or the legal
system).
Fifteen years ago, British Columbia enacted the Social Service Tax
Amendment Act (No. 2), 199310 imposing a 7 per cent tax on legal fees,
the only professional fees so taxed. This legislation was a response to a
judicial finding that predecessor legislation was ultra vires under section
7 of the Charter on grounds of vagueness.11 Ostensibly, the tax was
intended to fund legal aid; however, the proceeds were included in the
province’s general revenue and it was not possible to track whether, as
the Supreme Court of Canada said, “how much (if any) of the tax
collected was put towards legal aid, or other initiatives aimed at
increasing access to justice”.12
The facts were sympathetic, since Christie was a lawyer who served
poor and low-income people and charged these clients low fees. An
earlier challenge had been unsuccessful because, although the Court of
Appeal held that there was a constitutional right to access to the legal
system, it found that there was no evidence to show that anyone was
denied that right because of the tax.13 Christie sought to remedy that
deficiency by adducing affidavit evidence from individuals who stated
that the tax prevented their obtaining legal advice and from himself
about the debilitating effect on his practice of the tax.14 Christie also
maintained that he had to take the tax out of the fees he was already
charging, rather than add it to his fees, because his clients did not want
10

S.B.C. 1993, c. 24.
The Social Service Tax Amendment Act, 1992 provided that legal fees were subject to the
Social Service Tax Act, with some exceptions, including where there was not a “connection”
between the legal services and British Columbia. The legislation was challenged by the B.C. Branch
of the Canadian Bar Association (“CBA BC”) and the Law Society of British Columbia, and the
Court held the “connection” provision to be vague: Canadian Bar Assn., British Columbia Branch v.
British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] B.C.J. No. 407, 101 D.L.R. (4th) 410 (B.C.S.C.). In
response, the legislature enacted the statute at issue in Christie, which the Law Society and CBABC challenged, unsuccessfully, on the basis that the tax it provided for was not a direct tax and
therefore ultra vires the province: Canadian Bar Assn. v. British Columbia (Attorney General),
[1994] B.C.J. No. 1013, 91 B.C.L.R. (2d) 207 (B.C.S.C.). Yet another challenge to the legislation,
by an individual lawyer, was also unsuccessful: John Carten Personal Law Corp. v. British
Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] B.C.J. No. 2460, 40 B.C.L.R. (3d) 181 (B.C.C.A.), application
for leave to appeal dismissed, [1998] S.C.C.A. No. 205 [hereinafter “John Carten, Personal Law
Corp.”]. The history is taken from Christie v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2005] B.C.J.
No. 217, 250 D.L.R. (4th) 728, 2005 BCSC 122 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Christie (B.C.S.C.)”].
12
Christie, supra, note 3, at para. 1.
13
John Carten Personal Law Corp., supra, note 11, at paras. 12-14.
14
Nevertheless, the Court in Christie implies that even had it found that there is a general
right to counsel, it would have dismissed the case because of an inadequate evidentiary record:
Christie, supra, note 3, at para. 28.
11
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to or, more to the point, could not, pay larger fees. Because his clients
often did not pay him or were late in paying him, he was faced with
paying the tax out of his low income. He could not or did not pay the tax
and the provincial government seized moneys from his bank account.
The chambers judge accepted as fact that
… some of Mr. Christie’s clients could not obtain needed legal
services if Mr. Christie did not act for them … if Mr. Christie were to
charge them his hourly rate plus the social services tax, they could not
pay him … if Mr. Christie is not paid the minimum amount which he
charges, in most of his cases he could not continue to practice law, thus
denying those individuals access to justice. 15

In addition to accepting the affidavit evidence, the chambers judge also
took notice of her own experience with unrepresented litigants to
conclude that “many self-represented individuals in a wide variety of
cases are denied effective access to justice when they cannot afford
appropriate legal representation”.16
Christie also deposed that the costs of running his practice increased
because he had to hire a part-time bookkeeper and take more time from
his practice to supervise the accounting. Justice Koenigsberg was less
responsive to the inconvenience and administrative costs Mr. Christie
argued that he faced because of the tax than to the financial barriers to
the clients, saying that these facts were not determinative of the
constitutionality of the tax.
The Court of Appeal in the earlier Carten case thought that if they
found that the tax prevented people from retaining lawyers, legal aid
would be available to these potential litigants.17 In Christie, the chambers
judge pointed out that Mr. Christie’s clients did not qualify for legal aid
because they had “modest incomes” and she “inferred” from the
evidence in the case, “buttressed by common knowledge in the courts,
that legal aid is no longer widely available, if it ever was, to all litigants
except those charged with criminal offences”.18
In reaching the conclusion that the tax was unconstitutional,
Koenigsberg J. had characterized the issue she had to decide narrowly,
explicitly rejecting the broader characterization proposed by counsel for
the Attorney General:
15
16
17
18

Christie (B.C.S.C.), supra, note 11, at para. 82.
Id., at para. 74.
John Carten Personal Law Corp., supra, note 11, at para. 14.
Christie (B.C.S.C.), supra, note 11, at para. 80.
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The issue of the tax is not whether the government must provide and
pay for legal counsel in any matter requiring legal services, but
whether the state can impose an additional financial burden on those
seeking to obtain legal services.19

Thus she held that the tax was unconstitutional to the extent that it
applied to services provided low income people, that is, persons below
the level of assets and income defined by the Family Duty Counsel
Program.20
The majority of the Court of Appeal upheld this decision,
proceeding on the basis that the case was simply about whether the tax
on legal services was unconstitutional, not whether the government has
an obligation to provide affordable legal services.21
Taking the position that certain core aspects of access to justice are
constitutionally guaranteed, Newbury J.A., for the majority in the Court
of Appeal, defined “core aspects of access to justice” as follows:
… reasonable and effective access to courts of law and the opportunity
to obtain legal services from qualified professionals, that are related to
the determination and interpretation of legal rights and obligations by
courts of law or other independent tribunals. 22

Members of the judiciary have stressed the importance of the ability
of litigants to effective access to the legal system and thus to justice in
other contexts, as well. For example, McLachlin C.J.C. has observed
that:
The most advanced justice system in the world is a failure if it
does not provide justice to the people it is meant to serve. Access to
justice is therefore critical. Unfortunately, many Canadian men and
women find themselves unable, mainly for financial reasons, to access
19

Id., at para. 81.
Id. Justice Koenigsberg said that she would have granted a declaration “that the Act is
ultra vires legal services provided for the enforcement or protection of civil or criminal law
constitutional rights regardless of the income level,” but was bound by Carten in which the majority
of the Court of Appeal decided otherwise. Her holding is thus limited with respect to income, but
does not appear limited to constitutional cases. The dissent in Carten also made his holding limited:
McEachern C.J.C. held that the tax was unconstitutional because it applied to litigation involving
the enforcement of constitutional rights, as well as other litigation, and concluded that it did
constitute a minimal impairment, since it “could have been imposed just on legal bills that do not
relate to the exercise or protection of guaranteed rights”: John Carten Personal Law Corp., supra,
note 11, at para. 101 (B.C.C.A.).
21
Christie v. British Columbia, [2005] B.C.J. No. 2745, 262 D.L.R. (4th) 51, at para. 41
(B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Christie (B.C.C.A.)”].
22
Id., at para. 30.
20
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the Canadian justice system. Some of them decide to become their own
lawyers. Our courtrooms today are filled with litigants who are not
represented by counsel, trying to navigate the sometimes complex
demands of law and procedure. Others simply give up. Recently, the
Chief Justice of Ontario stated that access to justice is the most
important issue facing the legal system.23

Yet in Christie, a decision of “The Court”, the Supreme Court
rejected the opportunity to alleviate, to at least some degree, the problem
identified by the Chief Justice. Having defined the issue as a general
right to counsel, the Court pointed out that a constitutional right to legal
services as a means to access to justice would apply to those who did not
have difficulty accessing legal services, such as corporations, as well as
all aspects of legal services, including advice. Thus
the logical result would be a constitutionally mandated legal aid
scheme for virtually all legal proceedings, except where the state could
show this is not necessary for effective access to justice. 24

It would be, the Court imagines, costly (“a not inconsiderable burden
on taxpayers”),25 since there are already many unrepresented litigants
and, even worse, if they did not have to fund their own cases, other
persons would bring lawsuits who would not do so if funded
representation were not available.
Compared to cases such as G. (J.), in which Lamer C.J.C. went to
considerable effort to limit his decision,26 in Christie, the Court went
beyond the narrow confines of the case (the validity of charging a tax on
legal fees) to deliver the message that it does not believe that there is a
broad constitutional right to paid legal representation, although there
may be a more circumscribed right, as in criminal law or in Crown
custody proceedings.27 It takes this approach despite recognizing that
23
“The Challenge We Face”, Remarks of the Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, P.C.,
presented at the Empire Club of Canada (Toronto: March 8, 2007), online at: <http://www.scccsc.gc.ca/court-cour/ju/spe.dis/bm07-03-08-eng.asp>. The Chief Justice’s reference to the Chief
Justice of Ontario’s comments comes from Tracey Tyler, “The Dark Side of Justice”, Toronto Star,
March 3, 2007. Melina Buckley refers more extensively to judicial ex curia statements about the
importance of legal representation for access to justice in “Searching for the Constitutional Core of
Access to Justice” (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 567.
24
Christie, supra, note 3, at para. 13.
25
Id., at para. 14.
26
New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] S.C.J.
No. 47, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “G. (J.)”].
27
In both cases, state-funded legal representation may be provided if required for a fair
trial, but only if the trial judge cannot provide sufficient assistance without becoming too
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Christie’s concern was about access to the legal system by persons of
low income.28 It describes Christie’s claim as being “for effective access
to the courts which, he states, necessitates legal services. This is asserted
not on a case-by-case basis, but as a general right” to “access aided by a
lawyer”.29 In these cases, since the individual must show that he or she
requires the assistance, the onus does not lie on the state to show that the
individual does not require it, as the Court fears would result from a
more broadly exercised right.30
The relationship between and among the Charter’s rights and
freedoms requires careful consideration. As the Court has noted, in some
ways the rights and freedoms are linked to each other. Thus “notions of
human dignity underlie almost every right guaranteed by the Charter”.31
Although “dignity” should not be treated as a distinctive right, it is an
“underlying value”.32 It is not unreasonable, therefore, to read the rights
and freedoms as incorporating the concept of dignity or, at least, being
informed by it. One might expect that this shared commitment would
result in the rights overlapping to some extent, rather than treating the
rights as silos. In Christie, the Court “reads down” the Charter by
approaching the rights as separate and distinct elements. Thus section
10(b) would be “redundant” if there were a general right to counsel. One
might argue that section 10(b) addresses the criminal context with its
different demands and expectations and is about “retaining” counsel (not
about who pays for it) and, importantly, about being informed of that
right. Still, the Court is not suggesting that section 10(b) is the only
provision addressing the right to counsel, for it points to section 7’s
guarantee, as interpreted, of “a right to counsel as an aspect of
procedural fairness where life, liberty and security of the person are
affected”, albeit through “a case-specific multi-factored enquiry”.33

interventionist. In criminal cases, factors such as the economic and educational circumstances of the
accused, the seriousness of the charge and potential penalty, the complexity and length of the trial
and the reason why legal aid was denied are taken into account: R. v. Rowbotham, [1988] O.J. No.
271, 41 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Rain, [1998] A.J. No. 1059, 1998 ABCA 315 (Alta. C.A.).
In child protection proceedings, the seriousness of the interest at stake, the complexity of the
proceedings and the capacities of the parent must be considered: G. (J.), supra, note 26, at para. 75.
28
Christie, supra, note 3, at paras. 3-5.
29
Id., at para. 10.
30
Id., at para. 13.
31
Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] S.C.J. No. 43, [2000]
2 S.C.R. 307, at para. 76 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Blencoe”].
32
Id., at para. 78.
33
Christie, supra, note 3, at paras. 24-25.
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The Court has considered the relationship between the different
guarantees and the Charter as a whole in a number of decisions. While
some judges have suggested that the guarantees should be interpreted as
discretely as possible, the more widely held view is that the Charter is a
holistic document and that it should also be interpreted in conjunction
with the unwritten normative principles.
The opinions in B. (R.) v. Metropolitan Toronto Children’s Aid
illustrate the different approaches.34 Chief Justice Lamer preferred to
maintain the guarantees within relatively strict boundaries. For example,
he defined “liberty” in section 7 narrowly as referring to physical
movement. He viewed section 7’s protection as limited to the loss of
physical liberty as a result of the operation of the legal system because
he believed that section 2, among other provisions, encompassed other
forms of liberty:
… I am unable to believe that the framers would have limited the types
of fundamental freedoms to which they intended to extend
constitutional protection in such explicit terms, in s. 2, and then, in s. 7,
conferred “general” protection by using a generic expression which
would, unless its meaning were limited, include the freedoms already
protected by ss. 2 and 6, as well as all freedoms that were not listed.
This approach is clearly contrary to the principles of legislative
drafting that require that a general provision be placed before the
provisions for its specific application. Moreover, if s. 7 were to include
any type of freedom whatever, provided that it could be described as
fundamental, we might seriously question the need for and purpose of
s. 2. Either it is redundant, or s. 7 should then be considered to be a
residual provision so that we can make up for anything that Parliament
may have left out.35

Justice La Forest, on the other hand, maintained that
liberty does not mean mere freedom from physical restraint. In a free
and democratic society, the individual must be left room for personal
autonomy to live his or her own life and to make decisions that are of
fundamental personal importance …36

including “the [parental] right to nurture a child, to care for its
development, and to make decisions for it in fundamental matters such
34
B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1994] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 1
S.C.R. 315 (S.C.C.).
35
Id., at 343.
36
Id., at 370.

526

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d)

as medical care”.37 In G. (J.),38 Lamer C.J.C. declined to consider
whether G. (J.)’s section 7 liberty interest had been contravened, since
he concluded that her security interest had been infringed and that her
treatment was not in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice.39 Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, with whom Gonthier and McLachlin
JJ. (as she then was) agreed, found a liberty violation, as well, agreeing
with the broader understanding of liberty expressed in other decisions.40
The Court has adopted the broader interpretation. In Blencoe, for
example, Bastarache J., speaking for the majority, endorsed the view that
the liberty interest encompassed personal autonomy and the freedom to
make fundamental life decisions.41 In Christie, the Court seems to have
resuscitated the narrower view about the nature of Charter guarantees,
one akin to the “watertight compartments” of the old federalism
jurisprudence.
Chief Justice Dickson established some of the basic interpretative
principles for the Charter in Big M Drug Mart and these have not been
subsequently disowned, except perhaps by a failure to abide by them.
There he said that one of the factors to be considered in determining the
meaning of a right or freedom is reference, “where applicable”, to “the
meaning and purpose of the other specific rights and freedoms with which
it is associated within the text of the Charter”. One might read this as
ensuring that “associated” rights and freedoms are given as different an
interpretation and scope as possible. Yet this rigid approach is inconsistent
with other principles of constitutional interpretation. For example, one
principle is that interpretation of the constitution “should be … generous
rather than … legalistic” and one that should be “aimed at fulfilling the
purpose of the guarantee and securing for individuals the full benefit of the
Charter’s protection”, as long as it does not overshoot the mark.42 Even
when the Charter explicitly guarantees a right, it does not mean that a
similar or related right might not be found in another section, intended to
address a different context. This is consistent with an evolutionary
approach to Charter interpretation that recognizes that the framers could
not have contemplated all forms a right would take or all contexts that
might attract the application of a right in the future: in short, the “living
37
38
39
40
41
42

Id.
G. (J.), supra, note 26.
Id., at para. 56.
Id., at paras. 117-18.
Blencoe, supra, note 31, at paras. 49ff.
R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 344 (S.C.C.).
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tree” approach, in contrast to a “frozen rights” approach.43 A nuanced
approach to interpreting the guarantees does not mean that each
guarantee becomes meaningless, although it does mean that interpreting
the constitution may be a somewhat more complex task.
Regardless of whether the Court is prepared to extend rights, it
should consider whether its approach might diminish rights already
recognized. The Christie Court does not consider how the imposition of
a tax on legal services affects the ability of litigants to take advantage of
the Charter’s section 10(b) and section 7 guarantees relating to the right
to legal representation, particularly as recognized in section 7. It would
be necessary to show that the interests affected in the civil action involve
the right to liberty or security and that the imposition of the surcharge
does prevent access and that it is inconsistent with substantive
administration of justice.44 Admittedly, this might stretch the interpretation
of section 7 beyond where the Court has taken it to date, but it is
appropriate that the Court at least consider how new developments
impact rights already acknowledged. One cannot assume that if the tax
prohibits private representation, the litigant will simply fall into the
category of those warranting state-funded legal counsel.
Christie challenges the Court’s view of the rule of law and its
willingness to treat the unwritten principles as substantive principles.
Justice Newbury, for the majority at the Court of Appeal, placed this
claim within the context of
the interplay between unwritten principles and written provisions,
between lofty descriptions of the fundamental nature of the rule of law
and the courts’ traditional deference to parliamentary supremacy.45

As Newbury J.A. explained, after ringing expressions of the
importance of the unwritten principles, the Supreme Court of Canada has
narrowed its view of the rule of law to one of procedure and has treated
the significance of the principles less seriously.
The courts below treated the rule of law expansively, depending in
part on Dickson C.J.C.’s comments in British Columbia Government

43

Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 155 (S.C.C.): “[A
constitution] must … be capable of growth and development over time to meet new social, political
and historical realities often unimagined by its framers.”
44
Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.) S. 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R.
486 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “B.C. Motor Vehicle Act”].
45
Christie (B.C.C.A.), supra, note 21, at para. 28.
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Employees’ Union v. British Columbia (Attorney General).46 There the
Chief Justice of British Columbia had, on his own motion, issued an
injunction against the picketing of the province’s courthouses as part of a
legal strike by the courthouse employees. In upholding the injunction
and the finding that the picketers would have been in criminal contempt
had they continued to picket, Dickson C.J.C. emphasized the importance
of access to the courts and implied that this refers not only to physical
access, but also more generally. He stated, “[t]here cannot be a rule of
law without access, otherwise the rule of law is replaced by a rule of
men and women who decide who shall and who shall not have access to
justice.”47 He adopted the Court of Appeal’s observation in that case that
[W]e have no doubt that the right to access to the courts is under
the rule of law one of the foundational pillars protecting the rights and
freedoms of our citizens. It is the preservation of that right with which
we are concerned in this case. Any action that interferes with such
access by any person or groups of persons will rally the court’s powers
to ensure the citizen of his or her day in court. Here, the action causing
interference happens to be picketing. As we have already indicated,
interference from whatever source falls into the same category. 48

Justice Southin, dissenting in Christie at the Court of Appeal, stated
that
the words “rule of law” in the preamble [to the Charter] do not create
any substantive independent ground upon which a court can find duly
enacted legislation to be “inconsistent with the provisions of the
Constitution” and therefore of no force and effect. 49

Having chosen to frame the issue differently from the more
contextual way it was articulated by the lower courts, as a general
constitutional right to counsel, the Supreme Court of Canada agreed with
the dissent in the Court of Appeal:
We conclude that the text of the Constitution, the jurisprudence
and the historical understanding of the rule of law do not foreclose the
possibility that a right to counsel may be recognized in specific and
varied situations. But at the same time, they do not support the
conclusion that there is a general constitutional right to counsel in
46

[1988] S.C.J. No. 76, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214 (S.C.C.).
Id., at para. 25.
48
Id., at para. 26, citing Re British Columbia Government Employees’ Union, [1985] B.C.J.
No. 1939, 20 D.L.R. (4th) 399, at para. 46 (B.C.C.A.).
49
Christie (B.C.C.A.), supra, note 21, at para. 22.
47
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proceedings before courts and tribunals dealing with rights and
obligations.50

Referring to the three components of the rule of law it identified in
the Reference re Manitoba Language Rights51 and Reference re
Secession of Quebec,52 the Court pointed out that they do not include
“general access to legal services”, although the list of three is not
exhaustive. In the Court’s view, legal representation is only one way in
which litigants may gain “effective” access to the courts or, more
broadly, “access to justice”. Significantly, it refers to legal services as “a
particular type of access to justice”.53 Yet the Court also refers to the
importance of lawyers in the legal system and the constitutional
recognition given to the role played by lawyers in some situations,
stating that “[a]ccess to legal services is fundamentally important in any
free and democratic society”.54
In Christie, the Supreme Court not only declined to treat the rule of
law as a separate grounding for constitutional rights, but also failed to
use this unwritten principle as a way of reading the written text. It
accepted the limited vision of the rule of law posed by the dissent in the
Court of Appeal.55 The unwritten principles are not meant to be
interpreted in a static manner any more than are the written provisions.
While not exactly taking a “frozen rights” approach to the interpretation
of the rule of law, the Court points out that “historically” it encompassed
only “a limited right that extended only, if at all, to representation in the
criminal context”.56 The Court has cautioned against a “frozen rights”
approach since the earliest of Charter cases57 and the Court in Christie
50

Christie, [2007] S.C.J. No. 21, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 873, at para. 27 (S.C.C.).
[1985] S.C.J. No. 36, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 (S.C.C.).
52
[1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.).
53
Christie, supra, note 50, at para. 10 (emphasis in original).
54
Christie, id., at paras. 22-23 (S.C.C.).
55
Christie (B.C.C.A.), supra, note 21, at para. 22.
56
Christie, supra, note 50, at para. 26.
57
See, e.g., B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, supra, note 44, at para. 53 and, more recently, with
respect to the common law, Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] S.C.J. No. 75, [2004] 3 S.C.R.
698, at para. 22 (S.C.C.). One might usefully compare Reference re Public Service Employee
Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] S.C.J. No. 10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.) with Dunmore v. Ontario
(Attorney General), [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016 (S.C.C.), or R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin
Delivery Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 75, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 (S.C.C.) with R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. PepsiCola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd., [2002] S.C.J. No. 7, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 156 (S.C.C.) and with
Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, [2007]
S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.) for examples of the Court’s willingness to expand its
understanding of a guarantee. The Court has drawn back from its expansive appreciation of the
51
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did acknowledge that the rule of law might support a right to counsel in
limited situations, acknowledging, indeed, that Imperial Tobacco left
open the possibility that the rule of law had more than the three
elements,58 but it almost precluded applying that approach in Christie by
the way that it defined Christie’s claim.
Christie59 highlights the difference between the Supreme Court of
Canada’s aspirational statements about the importance of access to
justice, including, moreover, the significance of lawyers in securing
access, and its reluctance to play a significant role in securing access
when it might be in tension with a limited view of the extent it should
impose financial obligations on the legislature. The case does not bode
well for further attempts to establish a broad constitutional right to legal
representation, particularly since Christie is a decision by “the Court”
and a full Bench, at that. The lesson of Christie is that it will be
necessary to develop the jurisprudence and access to the legal system on
a case-by-case basis, with the context to which the right to legal
representation applies defined narrowly.
2. Private and Public Interests: What Counts?
While Christie was about basic access to the legal system for
ordinary litigants, the capacity of a party to litigate public interest
constitutional challenges arose in Little Sisters (No. 2).60 The Little
Sisters bookstore wanted advance costs in order to continue its fight
against what it considered discriminatory conduct by Canada Customs in
not allowing certain books to cross the border, relying on British
Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band61 for its claim.
In the view of Bastarache and LeBel JJ., speaking for the majority, the
circumstances facing Little Sisters did not meet the stringent test applied
in Okanagan: “where a court would be participating in an injustice —

unwritten principles evident in Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court
(P.E.I.), [1997] S.C.J. No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.), however, where the unwritten principle of
judicial independence served to fill the gap lacking in the written text.
58
Christie, supra, note 50, at para. 21. See British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada
Ltd., [2005] S.C.J. No. 50, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473, at paras. 61-63 (S.C.C.): the actual text of Imperial
Tobacco is perhaps not as clear as suggested in Christie.
59
Christie, id.
60
Little Sisters (No. 2), [2007] S.C.J. No. 2, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 38 (S.C.C.).
61
[2003] S.C.J. No. 76, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 371 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Okanagan Indian
Band”].
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against the litigant personally and against the public generally — if it did
not order advance costs to allow the litigant to proceed”.62
After the bookstore’s partial victory in Little Sisters (No. 1),63
Customs continued to detain books destined for the bookstore and in
Little Sisters (No. 2), the bookstore requested the injunction refused in
the first case, as well as “[s]pecial or increased costs”.64 In addition to
appealing the detention of four books in two separate Customs
determinations, Little Sisters argued that Little Sisters (No. 1) had not
remedied the “systemic problems” in the way Canada Customs
approached the determination of whether books entering Canada are
obscene; therefore, a broader challenge was required and Little Sisters
bookstore was prepared to bring the challenge.65
Thus in addition to appealing Customs’ detention of four books
(“The Four Books Appeal”), Little Sisters asked for a systemic finding
that Customs be prevented from applying the impugned provisions to
itself or, indeed, “to anyone”, “until such time as the Court is satisfied
that the unconstitutional administration will cease”.66 It requested
advance costs after the release of Okanagan.
In Okanagan, members of four Indian Bands engaged in
unauthorized logging on Crown land in British Columbia were issued
with stop-work orders. The Bands claimed title to the land and
maintained that they had a right to log. They also argued that if the
matter were to go to trial, they did not have the resources necessary to
mount the kind of case required and thus requested advance fees and
costs “in any event of the cause”. Speaking for the majority of six
judges, Lebel J. accepted that the bands were in poor financial
circumstances. Although costs had been traditionally used to indemnify
the winning party, Lebel J. noted that “it has become a routine matter for
courts to employ the power to order costs as a tool in the furtherance of
the efficient and orderly administration of justice”.67 More recently, the
62

Little Sisters (No. 2), supra, note 60, at para. 5.
Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] S.C.J. No.
66, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Little Sisters (No. 1)”]. While the majority of the
Court found that Canada Customs’ practices in detaining books destined for the bookstore
contravened the Charter, it held that the legislative scheme itself was constitutional. The Court
refused to grant the injunction requested by Little Sisters because there was inadequate evidence to
do so.
64
Little Sisters (No. 2), supra, note 60, at para. 13.
65
Id., at para. 16.
66
Id., at para. 14.
67
Okanagan Indian Band, supra, note 61, at para. 25.
63
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courts have recognized that the awarding of costs “helps to ensure that
ordinary citizens have access to the justice system when they seek to
resolve matters of consequence to the community as a whole”, even
when parties making constitutional challenges fail.68
Although interim or advance costs have been ordered in a wide
range of cases, for a court to exercise its discretion to order the costs, the
case must meet three criteria: the litigant must be unable to pursue the
litigation because of impecuniosity without the costs award; the case
must have “sufficient merit to warrant pursuit”; and “there must be
special circumstances sufficient to satisfy the court that the case is within
the narrow class of cases where this extraordinary exercise of its powers
is appropriate”.69 A case may be “special” because it is a public interest
case70 and concerns that awarding costs is effectively prejudging the
outcome of a case are “attenuated” if costs would be awarded regardless
of whether the litigant was successful.71 Justice Lebel also identified a
number of factors to ensure that costs remain reasonable, that a litigant is
not encouraged to engage in additional litigation and that the award does
not operate unfairly on other parties.72
Justice Lebel found that all the criteria were met in Okanagan. In
particular, he found that the claim of title and logging rights
are of profound importance to the people of British Columbia, both
aboriginal and non-aboriginal, and their determination would be a
major step towards settling the many unresolved problems in the
Crown-aboriginal relationship in that province. In short, the
circumstances of this case are indeed special, even extreme. 73

The dissent in Okanagan maintained that the awarding of interim
costs should be left to the trial judge, not awarded by appellate courts,
68
Id., at paras. 27-29. An example of costs awarded in favour of an unsuccessful litigant is
B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1994] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 31
(S.C.C.). The Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal awarded the Crown costs in Métis
National Council of Women v. Canada (Attorney General), [2006] F.C.J. No. 280, 2006 FCA 77
(F.C.A.), affg [2005] F.C.J. No. 328, 2005 F.C. 230 (F.C.) when the M.N.C.W. was unsuccessful in
challenging their exclusion as an organization from resource development programs directed at
Aboriginal communities under ss. 15 and 28 of the Charter. M.N.C.W.’s application for leave to
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed with costs: [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 170. The
courts viewed M.N.C.W. as raising its own private interest, not the issue of whether the exclusion of
female-dominated organizations was discriminatory.
69
Okanagan Indian Band, supra, note 61, at para. 36.
70
Id., at para. 38.
71
Id., at para. 39.
72
Id., at para. 41.
73
Id., at para. 46.
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and that the majority’s decision constituted a significant extension of the
principles governing the awarding of discretionary costs.74 The dissent
also emphasized that in matrimonial cases, where interim costs are often
awarded, it is presumed that there will be some distribution of the assets
between both parties, not that one party will “lose” in the usual sense.75
It is possibly noteworthy that the majority decision in Little Sisters
(No. 2) is written by both Lebel J., who wrote the majority judgment in
Okanagan, and Bastarache J., who dissented in Okanagan.76 The
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in Little Sisters (No. 2)
concluded that the issues raised there did not rise to the level of public
interest warranting interim or advance costs.77 For them, Okanagan had
now become a case in which “[t]he bands had been thrust into complex
litigation against the government that they could not pay for, and the
case raised issues vital both to their survival and to the government’s
approach to aboriginal rights.”78 The majority obviously sees Little
Sisters’ interests as individual and private, interests that do not meet the
Court’s articulation of the Okanagan test of whether “a court would be
participating in an injustice — against the litigant personally and against
the public generally — if it did not order advance costs to allow the
litigant to proceed”.79
The majority sought to diminish the precedential value of Okanagan,
by describing the circumstances in that case as “[a]n exceptional
convergence of factors”: the bands could not afford litigation, especially
given their other needs, particularly housing; but if they did not continue
to log, they would not be able to build the houses; and it was in the
public interest to resolve the way in which land claims would be
resolved. Therefore, the Court “held that the public’s interest in the
litigation justified a structured advance costs order insofar as it was
necessary to have the case move forward”.80 Okanagan, the majority in
Little Sisters (No. 2) maintained, was an “evolutionary step, but not a
revolution”, in the awarding of interim costs.81 (Justice Bastarache had
not distanced himself in his concurrence with Major J.’s dissenting
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Id., at paras. 54-55 (per Major J.).
Id., at para. 74.
Id.
Little Sisters (No. 2), supra, note 60.
Id., at para. 2.
Id., at para. 5.
Id., at para. 33.
Id., at para. 34.
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opinion in Okanagan with Major J.’s comment that Okanagan was a
significant change in the interim costs rules).82
The majority cautioned that the awarding of interim or advance costs
for public interest cases (“public interest advance costs orders”) is “to
remain special and, as a result, exceptional” and is to occur only “as a
last resort”.83 Thus:
[a]n application for advance costs may be entertained only if a litigant
establishes that it is impossible to proceed with the trial and await its
conclusion, and if the court is in a position to allocate the financial
burden of the litigation fairly between the parties.84

Litigants seeking advance costs must show that they cannot obtain the
required funding through alternative means; if there are other ways of
resolving the matter, it is not an injustice to deny the costs for a trial; and
the use of the costs must be scrutinized.85
The main distinction between Okanagan and Little Sisters (No. 2) is
that the Court concluded that the issues in Okanagan are of significant
public interest regardless of the outcome because the outcome will
identify a method by which land claims can be addressed, while the
constitutionality of Customs’ practices will be of public interest only if
the outcome is that Customs has behaved unconstitutionally.86 As with
Christie, the framing of the case inevitably influences the conclusions
reached by the judges. In Christie, the contrast in the articulation about
what was at stake in the case arose from a comparison between the lower
courts and the Supreme Court; in Little Sisters (No. 2), the contrast is
found in the differences between the majority and dissenting opinions.87
The majority, as well as McLachlin C.J.C., Charron J. concurring,
who agreed on the outcome, treated Little Sisters (No. 2) only minimally
as a continuation of Little Sisters (No. 1). They focused on applying the
test more or less to the circumstances underlying Little Sisters (No. 2)
rather than as significantly informed by Little Sisters (No. 1). This
becomes more obvious when these judgments are compared to Binnie
J.’s dissent (in which Fish J. concurred) in Little Sisters (No. 2). The
82
Okanagan, supra, note 61, at para. 84: Major J. stated that the majority’s extension of
interim costs “should be seen as a new rule and not an adaptation of existing law”.
83
Little Sisters (No. 2), supra, note 60, at para. 36.
84
Id., at para. 36.
85
Id., at paras. 40-43.
86
Id., at paras. 64-65.
87
Christie, [2007] S.C.J. No. 21, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 873 (S.C.C.). Little Sisters (No. 2), supra,
note 60.
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majority bifurcated the Four Books Appeal and the Systemic Review to
make the Four Books Appeal effectively a private business matter for
Little Sisters, while finding that there was no supporting evidence for the
Systemic Review.
Justice Binnie, in contrast, stated, “This fight is not just about four
books. As was the case in Little Sisters No. 1, the real fight is about
alleged systemic discrimination exemplified by the Four Books
Appeal.”88 This is so, even though he rejected Little Sisters attempt to
use the Systemic Review itself as, in effect, a “privately initiated public
enquiry” or “a sort of informal class action”.89 He continued:
The government is in effect being accused of fighting a war of
attrition. Today four books, tomorrow another four books. Litigation
follows litigation until the rational businessperson is forced to throw in
the towel. This is how civil liberties can be eroded, little by little,
yielded in small increments that case by case are not worth the cost of
the right. It takes an unbusinesslike litigant like Little Sisters to elbow
aside purely financial considerations (to the extent it can) and carry on
what is sees as unfinished Charter business against the government.
Having done so successfully and at its own expense in Little Sisters
No. 1, it asks the court for an exceptional order of advance costs to
make good the victory it thought it had won in Little Sisters No. 1.
Little Sisters may be right or it may be wrong in its allegations, but its
motive can hardly be financial, and its claim to advance costs should
not be assessed on that basis.90

Justice Binnie considered that Little Sisters (No. 2) had reached the
required level of “special case” (it was sufficiently special) in large
measure because of Little Sisters (No. 1).91 Justice Binnie also noted that
although the majority in Okanagan maintained that the trial judge is
responsible for determining whether a case is “special enough” to
warrant interim costs, in Little Sisters (No. 2), the majority rejected the
trial judge’s finding on this point and that “in both cases to reach this
Court on the advance costs issue, the trial court has been reversed.”92

88

Little Sisters (No. 2), id., at para. 128 (emphasis in original).
Id., at para. 130.
90
Id., at para. 129.
91
Id., at para. 137. All the criteria for advance costs are therefore met. Justice Binnie also
held that it would be appropriate if Little Sisters were successful in obtaining damages, it should
repay the advance costs.
92
Id., at para. 154.
89
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By characterizing Christie’s claim more broadly than Christie
himself seemed to intend, the Court was apparently more justified in
denying that the rule of law requires that at least some litigants (in
addition to those already specified in previous cases) should have access
to state-funded counsel.93 By characterizing Little Sisters’ claim more
narrowly than Little Sisters intended, the majority of the Court were
apparently more justified in refusing Little Sisters advanced costs.94
3. Official Intermeddler or Civic-Minded Citizen?
We usually see access to justice realized through the extension of
rights or increased participation. It is not clear that that is always the
case, however. For example, in Alliance for Marriage and Family v.
A. (A.),95 LeBel J. dismissed the Alliance’s attempt to gain party status in
order to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeal in a case in which it
had been an intervenor.
While not itself a constitutional case, A. (A.) v. B. (B.),96 the case in
which the Alliance intervened, involved a Charter challenge at the Court
of Appeal (since it was raised there first, the Court refused to consider it)
and granting status would have left open the prospect of third parties
appealing constitutional cases in which the constitutional issues had been
raised in private litigation, a common way for these issues to arise. In the
original case, B.B. was father to a child of whom C.C. was the mother
and A.A., C.C.’s lesbian partner, considered herself and was considered
by B.B., C.C. and the child also to be the child’s mother. A.A. sought a
declaration that she was a parent. The application judge dismissed the
application on the basis that the governing legislation97 did not
contemplate this parenting dynamic, but the Court of Appeal declared
A.A. to be the child’s parent under its parens patriae jurisdiction,
declining to deal with the Charter issues because they had not been
raised previously.98 While public interest plaintiffs may raise constitutional

93

Christie, supra, note 87.
Little Sisters (No. 2), supra, note 60, at para. 128.
95
[2007] S.C.J. No. 40, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 124 (S.C.C.).
96
[2007] O.J. No. 2, 83 O.R. (3d) 561 (Ont. C.A.), revg [2003] O.J. No. 1215, 225 D.L.R.
(4th) 371 (Ont. S.C.J.).
97
Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12.
98
A. (A.) v. B. (B.), [2003] O.J. No. 1215 (Ont. S.C.J.); A. (A.) v. B. (B.), [2007] O.J. No. 2,
2007 ONCA 2 (Ont. C.A.).
94
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questions that otherwise would not be addressed,99 the Court maintained
the position that it is inappropriate for a third party to “revive” litigation
between private parties:
What the applicant is attempting to do is to substitute itself for the
Attorney General in order to bring important legal questions relating to
the development and application of the law before this Court. As we
have seen, neither the Attorney General nor the immediate parties
intend, for reasons of their own, to contest the Court of Appeal’s
judgment. The applicant is certainly concerned about the impact of that
judgment. Nevertheless, it was merely an intervener in the Court of
Appeal, there to defend its view of the development of family law, but
it had no specific interest in the outcome of the litigation. 100

It might be argued that justice does not require that the Alliance be
allowed to import interests into what is admittedly a private matter with
a public component. It was sufficient that its intervenor status allowed it
to present policy reasons why the court should refuse A.A.’s request to
be declared the child’s parent at the Court of Appeal. Beyond that, the
Alliance had no interest in the case that warranted overriding the parties’
decision about how to proceed. It may be significant, however, that the
Alliance had not shown that it satisfied the requirements for public
interest standing, particularly coupled with characterizing the litigation
as, in essence, a private matter in which the Alliance had no “specific
personal interest in the outcome”.101
4. The Secular Legal System, Equality and Religion: Porous or
Solid Borders?
Bruker v. Marcovitz is, from one perspective, simply about when
someone may use the legal system to enforce a contract. From another,
however, it is a case about how members of minority groups gain access
to justice in the mainstream when the group adheres to tenets that are
inconsistent with mainstream values.102

99
Canadian Council of Churches v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),
[1992] S.C.J. No. 5, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 236 (S.C.C.).
100
Alliance for Marriage and Family v. A. (A.), supra, note 95, at para. 9.
101
Id., at paras. 10-12.
102
Bruker v. Marcovitz, [2007] S.C.J. No. 54, 2007 SCC 54 (S.C.C.). Richard Moon
analyzes this case in considerably greater detail: (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 37.
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Bruker v. Marcovitz involved a question of religious freedom under
the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms,103 a quasiconstitutional document, and thus gives us a sense of how the matter
would be approached had the same matter been raised under the
Canadian Charter, as was the case in Amselem.104 In Amselem, Jewish
owners of condominiums wanted to build succahs on their balconies,
contrary to the corporation’s by-law that the balconies be kept clear.
They successfully challenged the by-law under the Quebec Charter on
the basis that it infringed their religious freedom.
Speaking for the majority in Bruker v. Marcovitz, Abella J. noted
that “Canada rightly prides itself on its evolutionary tolerance for
diversity and pluralism”, but that “[n]ot all differences are compatible
with Canada’s fundamental values”.105 If access to justice is viewed as
access to full participation in and benefit from not only Canada’s legal
system, but also Canada’s commitment to particular norms and values,
as mediated by the legal system, then the courts have a major role to play
in determining how this objective is manifested. Bruker v. Marcovitz is
about how the courts enforce Canada’s commitment to pluralism: here
the issue is the tension between religious beliefs and practices and sex
equality. One might also consider it to be a case about whether
individuals more appropriately gain access to justice through secular or
religious institutions, when the bar to justice is religious.
After her divorce from Jason Marcovitz, Stephanie Bruker wanted to
remarry in a religious ceremony, but could not do so because her former
husband would not grant her a get, an act within his control under Jewish
religious law (it would be within the wife’s control to refuse the get).
Without the get, she remained his wife and if she did remarry in a civil
ceremony, her children would be “illegitimate” under Jewish law. In
1990, the Divorce Act was amended to encourage a party to remove a
barrier to religious remarriage within the party’s control.106 Failure to do
so could result in the court’s exercising discretion not to grant the
recalcitrant party relief under the Divorce Act; an exception provided
that if the party refused because of genuine religious or conscientious
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R.S.Q., c. C-12.
Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Amselem”].
105
Bruker v. Marcovitz, [2007] S.C.J. No. 54, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 607, at paras. 1-2 (S.C.C.).
106
R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), s. 21.1(3).
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reasons, the court could not exercise its discretion to refuse the party’s
request for relief.107
In the settlement of the issues arising out of the end of their
marriage, Ms Bruker and Mr. Marcovitz agreed to attend before a
rabbinical court to obtain the get. For 15 years, Mr. Marcovitz refused to
abide by the agreement on the basis that his freedom of religion meant
that he did not have to do so. Ms Bruker argued that she had considered
the get in negotiating the terms of their agreement around the issues
arising from the end of their marriage and sought damages for Mr.
Marcovitz’s failure to provide the get.108 She did not request that the
court compel Mr. Marcovitz to provide the get. Accordingly, while this
case may be about freedom of religion with a subtext of equality, it is
also about conforming to a voluntarily made contract.
For Abella J., as long as the contract is valid, its religious element
does not make it non-justiciable, the position Deschamps J. (Charron J.
concurring) took in her dissent.109 While the courts have generally (but
not always) taken a “hands-off” approach to adjudicating internal church
disputes, this has not been the case when the rights of an individual to
claim a legal remedy have been met with objections based on religion.
The guiding principle is that courts seek to avoid adjudicating religious
doctrine.110 In Abella J.’s view, this case did not require consideration of
religious doctrine because it was simply about the refusal of one party to
abide by a contract into which he voluntarily entered, even though the
substance of the contract involved a religious practice.
Underlying Abella J.’s treatment of the issue is her position that the
husband translated a religious practice and a moral duty into a legal
obligation.111 The husband sought to avoid the contract by arguing that
its enforcement would be against public order, since it contravened his
freedom of religion.112 Justice Deschamps, on the other hand, asserted
that “the undertaking to appear before the rabbinical authorities for a
107
Bruker v. Marcovitz, supra, note 105, at paras. 7-8. The provision does not apply if the
power to remove the barrier lies with religious officials: Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.),
s. 21.1(6). In Bruker, there was no doubt that the husband could provide the get.
108
The facts are taken from Abella J.’s judgment: id., at paras. 23ff.
109
Id., at para. 41, per Abella J., and para. 175, per Deschamps J.
110
Justices Abella and Deschamps both review the case law in this area: id., at paras. 42ff,
per Abella J., and para. 124, per Deschamps J.
111
Id., at para. 51.
112
The husband characterized the contract as a “religious undertaking”, arguing that the
secular courts could not enforce a religious undertaking or, in other words, that religious
undertakings are not justiciable: id., at para. 119, per Deschamps J.
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religious divorce, like an undertaking to go regularly to church, to
synagogue or to a mosque, is based on a duty of conscience alone”. The
undertaking is “purely a moral obligation that may not be enforced
civilly”.113
In Abella J.’s opinion, Mr. Marcovitz’s agreement to provide the get
was actually consistent with public order and the relationship between
equality and religious freedom reflected in the Divorce Act.114
Furthermore, his reason for refusing to provide the get was not because
he had a religious objection to it, but because he “was angry at Ms.
Bruker”, a crucial finding in the case for the majority. 115 More broadly,
and less dependent on the existence of the contract, “[t]he refusal of a
husband to provide a get … arbitrarily denies his wife access to a
remedy she independently has under Canadian law and denies her the
ability to remarry and get on with her life in accordance with her
religious beliefs.”116 It is not insignificant that the husband’s refusal to
provide the get had a major impact on Ms Bruker’s life precisely
because she chose to conform to her religious beliefs that without the
get, she could not remarry or have legitimate children under Jewish law.
Although there are hints in the majority judgment that a refusal to give a
get, absent an agreement to provide one, would result in damages in the
appropriate case, it is far less likely that the court would require a
husband to provide a get or even appear before a rabbinical court to
request one.
In awarding damages to Ms Bruker for the breach of the contract by
Mr. Marcovitz, the majority concluded that the claiming of religious
grounds by the party seeking to renege on the contract did not override
the other party’s access to the legal system to enforce the contract. In
other words, Ms Bruker was not denied access to justice because Mr.
113

Id., at para. 175.
Id., at para. 63. It should be noted that Mr. Marcovitz withdrew his initial challenge to
the constitutionality of s. 21.1 of the Divorce Act: id., at para. 34. Justices Abella and Deschamps
disagreed about the impact that the Divorce Act was to have in the case: see para. 34 for Abella J.’s
characterization and para. 105 for Deschamp J.’s.
115
Id., at para. 69. As Abella J. wrote, “There is no doubt that at Jewish law he could refuse
to give [a get], but that is very different from Mr. Marcovitz being prevented by a tenet of his
religious beliefs from complying with a legal obligation he voluntarily entered into and of which he
took the negotiated benefits” (emphasis in original).
116
Id., at para. 82. Justice Deschamps implicitly cast doubt on whether the reason for not
remarrying was Ms Bruker’s religious beliefs by pointing at para. 113 to the trial judge’s
enumeration of several acts by Ms Bruker contrary to Orthodox Judaism. Justice Deschamps also
brought Ms Bruker’s character into the equation in other ways; see, e.g., para. 109’s reference to Ms
Bruker’s difficult relationship with her daughters.
114
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Marcovitz raised a religious objection to meeting his agreement.
Limiting the remedy to damages (the remedy Ms Bruker requested)
rather than enforcing the performance of the contract by requiring Mr.
Marcovitz to appear before the rabbinical court, meant that the Court
was not compelling him to take a “religious step”. It minimized the role
religion played in the agreement and in effect characterized the
agreement as a promise to take certain action, action which happened to
have religious significance.
Justice Deschamps in dissent focused on the religious significance of
the promise (it was not merely a promise but a promise of a particular
kind) and on the religious consequences of the failure to abide by the
promise. Religion is the core of the matter, not a happenstance. It is the
core because Ms Bruker’s reasons for wanting the get were religious, to
enable her to live a religious life. Nothing prevented Ms Bruker
marrying in a civil ceremony, but that would not be “remarriage” for her.
Similarly, the law makes no distinction between children born within or
outside wedlock. For Ms Bruker, however, children of a civil marriage
would be illegitimate without the get. Although implicit in both
opinions, both Abella and Deschamps JJ. avoided making an explicit
statement about the equality ramifications of the get. Only the man is
able to provide the get and only the husband can therefore limit the
wife’s future by denying it to her. The wife can refuse to accept the get
and therefore prevent the husband’s remarrying in a religious ceremony
but, while this falls within the provisions of the Divorce Act, it is not
the reason the Divorce Act was amended. The Divorce Act provisions,
in the context of the get, are directed at the possibility of an abusive
use of the husband’s power over the wife’s future through the get.
On its face, the dissent seems to say to Ms Bruker, “bad luck”, you
will be denied access to justice because the impact of your husband’s
refusal to abide by his agreement — a refusal that in the usual case
would allow you access to the legal system to obtain a remedy — arises
from religious practice. But this is not what Deschamps J. said that she
was saying. On the contrary, preventing Ms Bruker from enforcing the
contract was actually a way to maintain the separation of religion and
the justice system. Equality could not be advanced by recognizing the
damage caused by the religious consequences that would occur if the
contract was not enforced; rather, equality would be advanced by
treating the religious consequences as outside the system. It was not Ms
Bruker’s access to justice that mattered; it was ensuring that the system
providing access to justice was not tainted by religious considerations.
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Far from condemning the inequality that flowed from the get, the
dissent reinforced it under the guise of taking an arm’s length approach.
Justice Deschamps framed the issue as “whether the civil courts can be
used not only as a shield to protect freedom of religion, but also as a
weapon to sanction a religious undertaking”.117 In her view, the majority
“sanction[ed] the religious consequences of delaying consent for a get
signif[ying] that it endorses those consequences even if they are contrary
to the hard-won gains (aquis) of Canadian society”.118 Only when a
religious undertaking (such as a religious marriage contract) meets the
requirements for a civil contract, should the courts enforce the remedial
provisions of the contract; they should not, however, give a remedy for
the religious consequences of the failure to abide by the contract. For
Deschamps J., this case falls into the latter category, since not being able
to remarry or have legitimate children are consequences determined by
religion.119
Significantly, Deschamps J. did not accept that the contract entered
into by the parties constituted a contract under Quebec law, because it
did not have as its object a “juridical act”. Here the object was the
obtaining of a religious divorce, an object “not capable of legal
characterization” or of juridical consequences, since the rabbinical
authorities do not play the same role as religious authorities may in
marriage: their rulings do not acquire civil status. Accordingly,
Deschamps J. concluded that “one of the essential elements of contract
formation is missing” and the agreement to attend at the rabbinical court
to obtain a religious divorce is “purely a moral obligation that may not
be enforced civilly”.120
Justice Deschamps maintained that the ground of damages is not
recognized in Canadian or Quebec law: the religious consequences of the
husband’s not providing the get are not consistent with the civil law
which provides that a woman does not require her husband’s consent to
remarry and that children are treated equally whether born into a
marriage or not. Thus to award damages is to sanction the religious law
and thus “impose a rule that is inconsistent with the rights the secular
courts are otherwise responsible for enforcing”121 or, phrased even more
117

Id., at para. 101.
Id., at para. 103. The “hard-won gains” are freedom of religion and the right to equality.
119
Id., at para. 123.
120
Id., at paras. 174, 176. For Deschamps J.’s discussion of the object of the contract and
why this contract does not contain an object, see paras. 171ff.
121
Id., at para. 179.
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strongly, “the assessment of damages would require the court to
implement a rule of religious law that is not within its jurisdiction and
that violates the secular law it is constitutionally responsible for
applying”.122 Justice Deschamps described as a “clear rule” the principle
that “religion is not an autonomous source of law in Canada”123 and that
it is crucial that the state be neutral with regard to religion.124
For the majority, the issue is far simpler:
The promise by Mr. Marcovitz to remove the religious barriers to
remarriage by providing a get was negotiated between two consenting
adults, each represented by counsel, as part of a voluntary exchange of
commitments intended to have legally enforceable consequences. This
puts the obligation appropriately under a judicial microscope.125

Yet it is also true that not only did the husband claim that religion lay
behind his refusal to abide by the contract (a religious belief that did not
prevent his making the contract initially and a position the majority did
not accept), but that the wife also maintained that her desire to enforce
the contract lay in her religious belief (a claim about which the dissent
seems skeptical). Assuming that both parties were stating their positions
in good faith, the majority sanctioned one party’s commitment to her
religious tenets while disregarding the religious belief of the other, since
the damages are premised on the wife’s inability to pursue a “normal”
life following divorce, but a normal life under Jewish law. Justice Abella
was able to do this in part because she took Ms Bruker’s profession of
belief at face value, while questioning Mr. Marcovitz’s, but more
significantly, she removed religion from the equation or, at least, she
avoided compelling a “religious action”. Ms Bruker then was granted
“access to justice”. Justice Deschamps placed religion front and centre,
on the other hand, permitting her to treat it outside the secular legal
system. As a result, she would have denied Ms Bruker the opportunity to
obtain damages for Mr. Marcovitz’s failure to grant her the right she
thought she had acquired through her agreement with him.

122
123
124
125

Id., at para. 180.
Id., at para. 183.
Id., at para. 184.
Id., at para. 47.
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III. CONCLUSION
In Christie and Little Sisters (No. 2), the Court has staked its position
in the ongoing problem of the financial difficulties facing litigants. In
Christie,126 the Court prefered the same rule for litigants having difficulty
affording a lawyer and corporations: neither may sleep under bridges.
The majority in Little Sisters (No. 2) recognized that litigants are often in
an unequal position, but considered that attempting to devise ways of
addressing this problem, of bringing “an alternative and extensive legal
aid system into being”, is not their role, since it “would amount to
imprudent and inappropriate judicial overreach”.127 While it may play a
crucial role in maintaining the rule of law and in serving as a vehicle by
which people may enforce rights and obtain justice, the Supreme Court
views itself as having only a narrowly prescribed role in enhancing
access or in reducing unequal access to the system necessary for
individuals to achieve those objectives. Moreover, the Court is not
willing to be a party to advancing public interest litigation:
The justice system must not become a proxy for the public inquiry
process, swamped with actions launched by test plaintiffs and public
interest groups. As compelling as access to justice concerns may be,
they cannot justify this Court unilaterally authorizing a revolution in
how litigation is conceived and conducted.128

Alliance for Marriage and Family v. A. (A.)129 says that “access to
justice” does not require giving intervenors with no direct interest in a
case the opportunity to force the parties to continue a battle that they
choose not to fight. “Access to justice” does mean that “outsiders”
cannot prolong a matter, at least in litigation between private parties.
Finally, while Bruker v. Marcovitz130 appears to engage the Court in
a religious dispute in a way inconsistent with its general approach to
religious cases, the facts of the case permit the majority to avoid
explicitly making a judgment about religious beliefs or enforcing
religious tenets. In Bruker, both parties share the same religious beliefs,
beliefs that may appear inherently contrary to the Charter value of
equality. This case would have been far more difficult for the majority,
126
127
128
129
130

[2007] S.C.J. No. 21, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 873 (S.C.C.).
[2007] S.C.J. No. 2, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 38, at para. 44 (S.C.C.).
Id., at para. 39.
[2007] S.C.J. No. 40, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 124 (S.C.C.).
[2007] S.C.J. No. 54, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 607, at para. 179 (S.C.C.).

(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d)

DEFINING ACCESS TO JUSTICE

545

and easier for the dissent, had Ms Bruker come to the Court asking that
Mr. Marcovitz obtain a get. Thus the majority’s approach may have less
value for future cases that explicitly or implicitly pose a tension between
equality and freedom of religion than does the dissent’s.

